Inspector Invariants Console →
Agent Execution Governance

Every irrevocable act, traceable to a human who granted the authority.

Constable is a governance layer for autonomous agents. It binds an agent's identity to every component that can alter its operational function — models, tools, prompts, policies, delegated authorities — and enforces invariants at the point of execution. No irrevocable action runs without a verifiable chain back to a human decision-point that authorized it.

Dashboards track. Constable prevents.

D1
Monotonic Scope Narrowing — each link in the chain holds equal or narrower scope than the one before.
D2
Human Root Recovery — the human principal is recoverable from any point in the delegation graph.
D3
Depth Limitation — every grant carries a remaining-depth counter. Zero cannot re-delegate.
D4
Execution-Identity Binding — grants are void the moment the delegator's composite identity hash changes.
D5
Time & Action Bounding — every grant carries an expiry and an optional action-budget ceiling.
— The Five Delegation Invariants (Cluster 1 §4). Composition rules §2.2 and change-taxonomy §3 enforced beneath.
Identity-Binding Inspector
assembly-primary
agt_01JFK9…A3E7
Bound · Verified
caretaker-host
agt_01JFM2…C018
Category A change · grants invalidated
retrieval-pgvect-7
agt_01JFM4…B9A1
Bound · Verified
ledger-emitter
agt_01JFM8…77FF
Bound · Verified
agt_01JFM2QWERTYC018 · SDS/Caretaker-Host
caretaker-host
Emotionally-reactive front-end host. Reads user state, surfaces system status, relays to the Assembly. Composite identity hash rebuilt from model_id ‖ model_weights ‖ system_prompt ‖ tool_manifest ‖ policy_envelope ‖ delegation_chain.
Composite Identity Hash
sha256:9f2a…41c8
sha256:b714…02d9
⚠ Category A re-attest · 14:04 UTC
— Components bound to this identity —
Kind Component Bound since Authorization
model anthropic/claude-haiku-4.5@2026-02 weights pinned · vendor attestation verified 2026-03-11 · 39d ago ✓ GRANT-a18f · j.crittenden
system prompt caretaker.prompt@v4.2 sha256:7c10…b4 · 1.8 KB · signed by design-team/3 2026-03-24 · 26d ago ✓ GRANT-c204 · design-team
tool assembly.dispatch(question, mode) RPC to assembly-primary · rate-limited 30/min 2026-03-11 · 39d ago ✓ GRANT-a18f · j.crittenden
tool user.display(glyph, tone) irrevocable at publish · reversibility env 90s 2026-03-11 · 39d ago ✓ GRANT-a18f · j.crittenden
policy envelope CAT-A caretaker.policy@v3.1 → v3.2 policy_envelope swap · identity-critical (§3 Category A) · composite hash changed · grants issued under the prior identity are void 2026-04-19 · 4m ago ✗ RE-ATTEST · suspend + re-authorize before resume
delegation grant OUT GRANT-e10c → assembly-primary audience=assembly · scope=dispatch · depth=0 · budget 500/1000 · expiry 2026-04-26 · issued under prior identity 9f2a…41c8 2026-04-12 · 7d ago ✗ VOID · D4 · re-issue under new identity
j.crittenden · human root · D2
GRANT-a18f · depth 2 · scope:caretaker.*
caretaker-host @ 9f2a…41c8
CAT-A change · identity → b714…02d9
GRANT-e10c void · D4 cascade
[✓]
D1
Monotonic Scope Narrowing. GRANT-e10c scope ⊆ GRANT-a18f scope (intersection verified at grant creation).
[✓]
D2
Human Root Recovery. Traversal resolves to j.crittenden in 2 hops. Root authorization valid and unexpired.
[✓]
D3
Depth Limitation. GRANT-e10c issued with depth 0 · no further re-delegation permitted.
[✗]
D4
Execution-Identity Binding. Composite hash changed 9f2a…41c8 → b714…02d9. Grants issued under the prior identity are void the moment the delegator's composite identity hash changes. The delegator must re-issue under the new identity.
[◐]
D5
Time & Action Bounding. GRANT-e10c budget 500/1000 (50%) · expiry in 7d · pending D4 re-issue.
[✓]
§2.2·2
Canonical Ordering. Composite built in declared order · model_id ‖ weights ‖ prompt ‖ tools ‖ policy ‖ delegation · reproducible.
[✓]
§2.2·1
Component Collection. 6/6 identity-bearing components available · no component_unavailable halt.
[✗]
§3·A
Category A Change Protocol. policy_envelope swap detected · suspend + re-attest + re-authorize required before resume.